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Foreign-Injured Antitrust Plaintiffs in U.S.
Courts: Ends and Means
By Salil K. Mehra*
I. Introduction
Growing international trade has focused attention on the
question of who should be allowed to bring antitrust claims in U.S.
courts. It has become harder to distinguish domestic trade from
international trade. As a result, courts have had to consider whether
they have jurisdiction over antitrust cases with foreign and domestic
impact.
The Supreme Court's decision in Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v.
California1 raised new questions about how open U.S. courts should
be to international antitrust cases. A key aspect of this controversy is
access to plaintiffs whose injury is deemed to have occurred abroad.
Most commentators, along with the Fifth Circuit and the U.S.
Department of Justice ("DOJ"), have concluded that only private
antitrust plaintiffs who are injured in the United States should be able
to sue in U.S. court. This "narrow" approach would constrict subject
matter jurisdiction for international antitrust plaintiffs. By contrast, in
2Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd., the D.C. Circuit came
down on the other side of this issue and joined the Second Circuit by
adopting a "broad" view of jurisdiction. This broad view would make
U.S. courts and U.S. antitrust lawsuits available to anyone who is
injured by price fixing or other anticompetitive conduct that has
direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effects on U.S.
commerce. By contrast, the narrow approach would layer an
* Associate Professor, Temple University, Beasley School of Law. Thanks to
participants for their comments at Loyola University Chicago School of Law's
February 20, 2004 conference on the private remedy in antitrust. Thanks also to
Sarah Beth Mehra for her editing skills and loving support. All errors and
omissions are the author's.
' 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
2 315 F.3d 338 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
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additional test, such as "U.S. marketplace participation," that
plaintiffs would need to satisfy.3 With the Supreme Court's recent
granting of certiorari in Empagran, concerning the access of foreign-
injured vitamin buyers to U.S. antitrust remedies against a global
cartel, this has become an issue of pressing significance.
Ultimately, the better approach will be the one that best
satisfies two goals. First, the rule adopted must foster the underlying
substantive goals of American antitrust. That is, potential violators
should be deterred from undertaking anticompetitive conduct. The
focus of this goal on fostering consumer welfare has inherent
distributional consequences. Second, scarce judicial resources should
be conserved. Achieving this goal is complicated by the fact that
there is as of yet no international forum for antitrust cases. As a
result, any particular cartel may find itself the subject of one or more
cases in national court systems. This judicial efficiency concern is not
inherently tied to distributional consequences at the domestic level
between consumers and producers, but can have an impact on such
distributional concerns, as this paper will suggest.
4
This article suggests that to make the proper choice between
standards requires an understanding of the extent to which
international antitrust cases make up the case mix of U.S. courts.
Even if we limit the analysis to cartel behavior, different types of
cases have different implications on the consumer welfare and
judicial efficiency criteria. Interestingly, the three most notable cases
3 See In re Microsoft Antitrust Litig., 127 F. Supp. 2d 702, 716 (D. Md. 2001)
(holding that "a plaintiff who has not participated in the U.S. domestic market may
not bring a Sherman Act claim"); see also Empagran, 315 F.3d at 360 (Henderson,
J., dissenting) (advocating adoption of rule where plaintiff's injury must be ied to
U.S. commerce); Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap AS v. Heeremac VOF, 241 F.3d
420, 249 n.28 (5th Cir. 2001) (without authority for distinctions based on
nationality in intemational trade, "hold [ing] that a foreign plaintiff [must] show
that its injuries arise from a United States market") [hereinafter "Statoil"]; A Most
Private Remedy: Foreign Party Suits and the U.S. Antitrust Laws, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 2122, 2142 (2001) (advocating ouster on standing grounds of Sherman Act
claims from U.S. court of "foreign purchasers who do not participate in U.S.
domestic markets"); Edward Cavanagh, The FTAIA and Subject Matter
Jurisdiction over Foreign Transactions Under the Antitrust Laws: The New
Frontier in Antitrust Litigation, 56 SMU L. REV. 2151, 2183 (2003) ("I therefore
have no difficulty in concluding that foreign consumers who have not participated
in any way in the U.S. market have no right to institute a Sherman Act claim.").
4 To the extent that nations may prefer that others bear the costs of operating
the fora utilized, there may be a nation-by-nation distributional component.
However, that is beyond the focus of this article, which is U.S. law regarding
international antitrust cases.
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on this issue that the Supreme Court is considering can be broken
down into a typology that helps understand how these two
approaches differ. Indeed, the typology can be looked at two ways.
First, one could conclude that if cases that favor the broad approach
predominate the case mix, then it is the superior standard.
Alternatively, one could conclude that the broad approach makes
sense in some cases within the typology, but should be restricted in
others.
The first part of the article explains the broad and narrow
approaches and their roots in recent case law. The second part creates
a framework illustrating the kinds of cases to which the approaches
may be applied. A brief conclusion follows.
II. How Do the Broad and Narrow Views Differ?
Three federal circuit courts have come to sharply varying
conclusions about Congress' choice of one word in the Foreign Trade
and Antitrust Improvements Act ("FTAIA"). Essentially, the FTAIA
is drafted as a limitation on the Sherman Antitrust Act's ("Sherman
Act") jurisdiction.5 The FTAIA states that for the Sherman Act to
apply to conduct involving foreign trade, two requirements must be
fulfilled. The first requirement is a version of the well-known
"effects" test from United States v. Alcoa.7 The conduct must have a
"direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect" on U.S.
commerce-that is, on domestic commerce, on imports into the
United States or on U.S.-engaged exporters. 8 Second, "such effect"
must "give[] rise to a claim under" the Sherman Act's substantive
5 The FTAIA also enacted a similarly-worded cut-back to the FTC Act.
Although written as a cut-back of jurisdiction, the Court has recognized that it is
"unclear.. .whether the [FTAIA's] 'direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable
effect' standard amends existing law of merely codifies it." Hartford Fire Ins. Co.
v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 n.23 (1993).
6 Other than "import" trade-which is carved out of the cut-back, creating
another issue of interpretation that may create conflict in the future. See Dee-K
Enter., Inc. v. Heveafil Sdn. Bhd, 299 F.3d 281, 287 (4th Cir. 2002) (concluding
that "[b]ecause this case involves importation of foreign-made goods, however-
conduct Congress expressly exempted from FTAIA coverage as
'involving... import trade or import commerce.. .with foreign nations,' id.-the
FTAIA standard obviously does not directly govern this case, even though it may
constitute an effort to 'clarify the application of United States antitrust laws to
foreign conduct' in other circumstances").
' 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
8 15 U.S.C.A. § 6a(1) (2004).
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provisions. 9
The meaning of the FTAIA's first requirement is now well-
settled and relatively uncontroversial. American enforcement
officials are not alone in applying an effects test to pursue foreign
conduct with effects within their jurisdiction.' 0 As a result, the
narrow view of subject matter jurisdiction amounts to an attempt to
exclude some private lawsuits against conduct that the effects test
would empower government antitrust enforcers to pursue."
By comparison, the FTAIA's second requirement has
received a lot of very recent attention. Essentially, the question is
whether the requirement that the domestic effect must give rise to "a
claim" means that the effect must give rise to: (1) the plaintiff's
Sherman Act claim; or (2) a claim, actual or hypothetical, by
someone other than the plaintiff under the Sherman Act.12 It has been
assumed that anyone whose claim arises from a U.S. effect must have
been injured in the United States.' 3 In an Internet age, this may not be
true in all cases.14 However, this assumption has led to the conclusion
that the distinction between the narrow and broad view rests on
whether the plaintiff's injuries stem from U.S. markets,' 5 or at least,
9 15 U.S.C.A. § 6a(2) (2004).
'o See, e.g., Ahlstrom-Osakeythio v. Comm'n (Wood Pulp) 1988 E.C.R. 5193,
[1998] 4 C.M.L.R. 901 (1988) (asserting jurisdiction over an agreement by non-EC
firms to fix prices of product sold to EC buyers on the grounds that conduct by
firms outside the European Community that 'has the object and the effect of
restricting competition within' the European Community violates article 85 of the
Treaty of Rome (now article 81)); Japan Fair Trade Commission, Notification
System Concerning M&As by Companies outside Japan (Jan. 1, 1999) (essentially
importing an effects doctrine into merger review), available at
http://www2.jftc.go.jp/e-page/notification/maexp.htm (last visited Apr. 28, 2004).
" It should be noted that the FTAIA's text does not limit its impact to private
litigants alone, although the cases involved in the current debate all involve
holdings regarding private litigants.
12 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2004).
13 Id.
14 See, e.g., Microsoft, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 717 (adopting a "U.S. marketplace"
participation test to address "status of purchasers who made their purchases directly
from Microsoft over the Internet," including foreign purchasers).
"5 See Statoil, 241 F.3d at 429 n.28 (only Court of Appeals ruling for narrow
view, "hold[ing] that the FTAIA requires that a foreign plaintiff show that its
injuries arise from a United States market.").
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whether the plaintiff has some level of "participation" in U.S.
commerce. 
16
A. The Narrow View
Perhaps surprisingly, a narrow approach has been adopted by
the vast majority of courts to address the issue, but by only one
federal circuit. 17 The Fifth Circuit in Den Norske Stats Qijeselskap
AS v. Heeremac (hereinafter "Statoil") concluded that "plain
language" compelled the conclusion that the FTAIA requires that a
plaintiff's claim arise from an injury tied to the United States.18
The plaintiff in Statoil claimed it paid for services in
connection with offshore oil drilling in the North Sea. 19 The plaintiff
was victimized by the same cartel that also had an anticompetitive
effect on similar commerce involving offshore oil drilling "in the
territorial waters of the United States in the Gulf of Mexico., 20 Two
of the defendants had already pled guilty to a related criminal
complaint filed by the DOJ; injured parties other than the plaintiff
had already filed damages complaints based on these U.S. effects.2'
Thus, it was fairly clear that the same conduct had an anticompetitive
16 See Cavanagh, supra note 3, at 2182 (arguing that "there is a difference
between a foreign purchaser who transacts business in the United States but takes
title and thus suffers injury abroad and a foreign purchaser who has no involvement
in the American marketplace, transacts business abroad, takes title abroad, and
suffers injury abroad").
17 See, e.g., Statoil, 241 F.3d at 439 (holding plaintiff must show that a
substantial anticompetitive effect on U.S. commerce "gives rise" to its antitrust
claim); Sniado v. Bank Austria AG, 174 F. Supp. 2d 159, 170 (S.D.N.Y. 2001),
vacated by 352 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 2003); Ferromin Int'l Trade Corp. v. UCAR Int'l,
Inc., 153 F. Supp. 2d 700 (E.D. Pa. 2001); Kruman v. Christie's Int'l PLC, 129 F.
Supp. 2d 620, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), rev'd 284 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2002), see infra
notes 23, 27; In re Copper Antitrust Litig., 117 F. Supp. 875 (W.D. Wis. 2000); S.
Megga Telecomm. Ltd. v. Lucent Tech., Inc., No. 96-357-SLR, 1997 WL 86413
(D. Del. Feb. 14, 1997); The 'In' Porters S.A. v. Hanes Printables, Inc., 663 F.
Supp. 494 (M.D.N.C. 1987); De Atucha v. Commodity Exchange, Inc., 608 F.
Supp. 510 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
18 See Statoil, 241 F.3d at 428 ("we find that the plain language of the FTAIA
precludes subject matter jurisdiction over claims by Foreign plaintiffs against
defendants where the situs of the injury is overseas and that injury arises from
effects in a non-domestic market").
'9 Id. at 422.
20 Id. at 422-423, 434 n.8.
2 Id. at 420.
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effect in the U.S. and gave rise to "a" claim under the Sherman Act.
Thus, the Fifth Circuit had to determine whether it was
enough that the "effect" on U.S. commerce-the anticompetitive
effects in the Gulf of Mexico-gave rise to Sherman Act claims, or
whether it was necessary that the effects gave rise to the plaintiff's
claim.22 The majority opinion sided with the latter view based on
what it saw as the plain language of the statute, as well as a
legislative history that it viewed as reinforcing its conclusion. 23 The
majority was relatively unconcerned with policy implications, save
for an unsupported assertion that "[a]ny reading of the FTAIA
authorizing jurisdiction" in the case "would open United States courts
to global claims on a scale never intended by Congress." 24
A focused dissent by Judge Patrick E. Higginbotham pointed
out that the majority's "plain language" argument was undercut by
the fact that "a" has a simple and universally understood meaning" as
"the indefinite article." 25 The dissent, like the majority, was able to
point to legislative history in support of its reading. Notably, the
dissent raised a policy argument to which the majority did not
respond: That private enforcement of U.S. antitrust laws supplements
the efforts of the DOJ and that the dissent's reading of the FTAIA
22 The court stated that, although the plaintiff "exported an average of 400,000
barrels of oil a day into the United States" in recent years-which incidentally
represents $12 million of imports daily and over $4 billion annually (at $30 per
barrel)-the plaintiff did not "allege any injury to itself derived from its export of
oil to the United States." Id. at 422 n.4 & 5. For that reason, presumably, the court
was spared having to consider whether all or part of the plaintiffs claim could be
said to arise from that domestic effect.
23 Statoil, 241 F.3d at 425 (stating that court's holding is "controlled by the
plain language" and also "fmd[ing] that the legislative history of the
FAIA... supports our determination.").
24 Id. at 431; see also id. at 421 (stating that "[t]he plaintiff is a Norwegian oil
corporation that conducts business solely in the North Sea" that "seeks redress
under the United States antitrust laws" and citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) to the effect that "United States antitrust
laws 'do not regulate the competitive conditions of other nations' economies"').
25 Id. at 432 (stating that "[t]here are many terms of art about which one can
debate whether Congress uses the term as courts do, but this word is not one of
them").
26 Id. at 433 n. 11. This is not surprising-any holistic view of the statute's
legislative history makes clear that it contains language to support both
interpretations, and is perhaps intentionally vague. See Salil K. Mehra, Deterrence:
The Private Remedy and International Antitrust Cases, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 275, 296-99 (2002).
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"ensures that parties injured by foreign aspects of the same
conspiracy that harms American commerce are part of the phalanx of
enforcers. 27
B. The Broad View
In Kruman v. Christie's International PLC, the Second
Circuit sided with the dissent in Statoil in concluding that the
FTAIA's "language is clear," and that since "Congress used the
indefinite article"-the statute says "gives rise to a claim"-"the
'effect' on domestic commerce need not be the basis for a plaintiffs
injurY; it only must violate the substantive provisions of the Sherman
Act." As a result, the court concluded that, where a conspiracy to
rig auctions for art, antiques, and collectibles had effects on U.S.
commerce, buyers and sellers injured by the foreign effects of that
conspiracy could maintain a Sherman Act claim.29 The court also
concluded that legislative history and the policy interest of making it
hard for violators to use the foreign effects of a worldwide scheme to
supplement the domestic branch of their conspiracy.
30
Interestingly, the court in Kruman suggested a very wide
interpretation of the second prong of the FTAIA. In particular, the
court concluded that "[t]he language 'gives rise to a claim' only
requires that the 'effect' on domestic commerce violate the
substantive provisions of the Sherman Act" and is not actually
"predicated on the existence of an injury to a plaintiff.",31 As a result,
a fair reading of the Second Circuit's interpretation is that a plaintiff
whose claim does not arise from the domestic effect of a conspiracy
does not need to show that "the violation has caused injury to a
plaintiff' in particular.32
By comparison, the D.C. Circuit in Empagran S.A. v. F.
Hoffinan-LaRoche, Ltd. adopted a slightly different version of the
27 Statoil, 241 F.3d at 439 (describing "the Clayton Act as recruit[ing] private
parties [to assist] the Department of Justice").
2 Kruman v. Christie's Int'l PLC, 284 F.3d 384, 400 (2d Cir. 2002).
29 Id. at 391, 403.
30 See id at 400, 403.
31 Id. at 399-400 (emphasis added).
32 Id. This is also how the D.C. Circuit construed Kruman. See Empagran S.A.
v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd., 315 F.3d 338, 351 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
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broad view. 33 The court considered whether the FTAIA permitted
subject matter jurisdiction over the claims of foreign purchasers of
vitamin products who alleged injury based on the foreign effects of a
worldwide vitamin cartel that also had adverse effects in the United
States.34 The D.C. Circuit ruled that the plaintiffs did have standing,
rejecting the Fifth Circuit majority's conclusion that the FTAIA
requires that their claim must arise from the domestic effects. 35 But,
unlike the Second Circuit, the Empagran court concluded that
"'giv[ing] rise to a claim' means giving rise to someone's private
claim for damages or equitable relief," and "[t]o satisfy this
requirement, the plaintiff must allege that some private person or
entity has suffered actual or threatened injury as a result of the U.S.
effect of the defendant's violation of the Sherman Act.",36 In other
words, even if the plaintiff's claim need not arise from the domestic
effect, there must be a real claim that someone else could bring
arising from that effect.
37
III. Pieces of a Framework
As a result of the decisions in Empagran, Kruman, and
Statoil, it has become clear that the distinction between the broad and
narrow view turns on the narrow view's additional requirement of a
nexus between the U.S. effect and the plaintiff's injury. Some courts
have made clear that this rule applies to foreign plaintiffs, and
apparently not Americans who suffer injury abroad.3 Some courts
have used the test of "U.S. marketplace participation" to adjudicate
whether the necessary link exists.
39
Whatever test may be adopted, every form of the narrow view
33 Empagran, 315 F.3d at 338.
34 Id. at 340.
35 id.
36 Id. at 352.
37 It is interesting that the D.C. Circuit chose to reach the question of whether
or not the claim arising from the U.S.-related effect need be a "real" one given that
it recognized that "[in the instant case, the conspiracy's effects did allegedly injure
and did give rise to the claims of some private entities-namely the domestic
plaintiffs who filed suit along with the foreign plaintiffs against the vitamin
companies." Empagran, 315 F.3d at 352.
38 See, e.g., Statoil, 241 F.3d at 249 n.28 ("hold [ing] that a foreign plaintiff
[must] show that its injuries arise from a United States market").
39 See, e.g., Microsoft, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 716.
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would restrict some types of international antitrust cases. Such
limitations are justified on several grounds. From the standpoint of
policy, it is claimed that the broad view could unleash a flood of
unmanageable cases with foreign parties and witnesses and that the
narrow view better serves cartel members who wish to cooperate with
the United States.40 Besides these arguments about the process of
antitrust case resolution, advocates of the narrow view also contend
that the substantive goals of antitrust policy-such as deterrence-are
not necessarily served by the broad view.4
Whether these arguments militate for the broad or narrow
view depends on what type of international antitrust case one is
discussing. Interestingly, the three cases discussed above, Empagran,
Kruman, and Statoil, provide examples that suggest that the
underlying case mix is important in deciding which legal rule is
preferable from the standpoint of both procedure and substance.
A. Empagran: The International Class
The facts of Empagran provide an example of an international
antitrust case that furthers substantive goals of American antitrust,
but does so at a significant cost in judicial administration.
A worldwide class of foreign plaintiffs would pose a
significant administrative challenge to a U.S. court. This may be true
even in a case like Empagran, where the plaintiffs are not ordinar7 2
consumers, but large, and often multinational, buyers of vitamins.
U.S. rules presume that class members wish to fall in behind the
named plaintiff, unless the court hears otherwise-a view supported
by class members' rights of notice, intervention, and opt out. But, in
the international context, this creates problems of notice.
Additionally, there is the problem of determining whether attorney
40 To be sure, proponents of the narrow view also make the argument that it
better comports with Congress' legislative intent. While nonpolicy arguments are
not the focus of this article, it must be acknowledged that these arguments about
legislative history are ultimately not as clear-cut as the advocates suggest, and, even
if they were clear-cut, they would be opposed to the plain meaning of the statute.
See, e.g., Mehra, supra note 26, at notes 95-106 and surrounding text.
41 Cavanagh, supra note 3, at 2185 (arguing that "even if.. .allowing Foreign
antitrust plaintiffs to sue would enhance deterrence in civil cases, permitting such
cases [could].. .decreas[e] overall deterrence").
42 Empagran, 315 F.3d at 340.
43 See John Bronsteen & Owen Fiss, The Class Action Rule, 78 NOTRE DAME
L. REv. 1419, 1434-1442 (2003).
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representation of these clients has been adequate." These issues
present difficult problems of administration for American judges.
However, the case for subject matter jurisdiction over suits
like that in Empagran rests on the way in which it furthers the
substantive aims of U.S. antitrust law. As the Supreme Court
explained in Pfizer v. India, allowing foreign victims of a Alobal
cartel to seek a U.S. remedy tends to help U.S. consumers. The
United States only represents part of the world market for some
products. If a potential violator knew that it would only face private
damage suits from American victims, the violator might still take part
in the cartel, if the gains from soaking non-Americans outweighed
the risk of an adverse U.S. judgment. Thus, to the extent other
nations' judgments are harder for plaintiffs to win, or that their
remedies are weaker than the U.S. treble damage action, potential
violators are encouraged at the margin to become actual violators.46
Some might contend that the substantive aims of U.S.
antitrust law need not be promoted solely by actions in U.S.
courtrooms. Private actions could be available in other nations'
courts, under their law. If plaintiffs can actually make use of private
actions in other nations,47 that would diminish the concerns expressed
in Pfizer. However, to the extent that foreign-injured plaintiffs choose
to seek U.S. remedies in U.S. courts rather than other remedies in
other fora, they reveal their preference for the U.S. remedy. This, in
and of itself, suggests that such plaintiffs view their alternative
remedies as weaker. This is not surprising, given the uniqueness of
the American treble damages remedy. 48 And, to the extent alternative
remedies are weaker, the logic of Pfizer continues to have force,
since even marginally weaker alternative remedies spells
encouragement at the margin to antitrust conspiracies.
It might also be claimed that there may be alternative methods
44 See Brief of the Government of Japan as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioners at 7-8, F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd. v. Empagran, S.A. (No. 03-724).
45 434 U.S. 308, 315 (1978) ("American consumers are benefited" by such
suits).
46 id.
47 But see, e.g., Harry First, Antitrust Enforcement in Japan, 64 ANTITRUST
L.J. 137, 147 (1995) (discussing how explicit statutory authorization for private
antitrust actions in Japan is virtually unusable).
48 Ofer Grosskopf, Protection of Competition Rules Via the Law of Restitution,
79 TEx. L. REv. 1981, 2000 n.61 (2001) (describing antitrust treble damages as
part of a "tendency [which] seems unique to the United States").
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of antitrust regulation to the private attorney general model. To be
sure, some other nations have pursued other models of dealing with
competition issues. But, of late there has actually been a trend abroad
towards adopting and strengthening private damage actions as a
compliment to government antitrust enforcement. In part, this
represents the realization of the synergies that government and
private enforcement create together.
B. Kruman: The Domestic International Class
In contrast to Empagran, the plaintiffs in Kruman were a class
of foreign and American citizens who had purchased fine art and
other collectibles at auctions outside the United States. 49 The
auctioneers had been parties to a price-fixing agreement concerning
their commissions. 50 The concept of foreign-injured Americans and
fairly identifiable plaintiffs makes Kruman a more easily
administrable case, as well as one that more directly fosters the goals
of U.S. antitrust law.
Consider the class of Americans who purchased fine art at
high-end auctions abroad, particularly in London. From the
standpoint of administration, it should not be hard to provide notice
to such a class, nor to handle certification. First, they are Americans,
just as are the members of many classes in antitrust, securities, and
other fields of law. In fact, they are likely to be far less numerous
than many other classes that have been certified. Moreover, those
who purchase fine art destined for museums or fairly rarified private
collections are also likely to be identifiable. Indeed, it might not be so
difficult to provide notice even to a class of foreign citizens injured
abroad at high-end auctions.
Additionally, a class of foreign-injured Americans furthers the
goals of U.S. antitrust law in a fairly direct way. Unlike in Empagran,
the private action of such a class does not further the welfare of U.S.
consumers in a roundabout fashion. Instead, the plaintiffs are U.S.
consumers. Moreover, to deny them recovery in this scenario
provides a fairly stark incentive for violators to move offshore, even
when serving U.S. consumers. This possibility of an end-run has been
noted in the past in justifying wider readings of the scope of U.S.
antitrust.5 ' As a result, a case like that of the foreign-injured
49 Kruman v. Christie's Int'l PLC, 284 F.3d 384, 389 (2d Cir. 2002).
50 Id.
51 See United States V. Nippon Paper Indus., 109 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997).
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Americans in Kruman may be an easy one to justify as proper for a
U.S. court.
C. Statoil: The Nonclass Multinational Plaintiff
In contrast to Empagran and Kruman, Statoil did not involve
a class, nor did it involve a global price-fixing conspiracy. 52 Instead,
the plaintiff in Statoil had purchased services from a foreign seller53
abroad. However, the plaintiff alleged that two foreign sellers and
an American firm had effected a global market allocation.54 As a
result, what plaintiff had to pay the foreign seller-and what
American buyers had to pay the American seller-was inflated by the
fact that there was no direct competition across regions.
55
From the standpoint of administrability, this scenario does not
present the challenges of notice to a class, class certification, or
evaluating the adequacy of attorney representation. Instead, a foreign
firm appears in a U.S. court-something that is routine in the federal
system, and has been for some time. From the standpoint of
furthering competition goals, this scenario follows the logic of Pfizer:
to the extent that the plaintiff has an inferior remedy in another
forum, denying a plaintiff access to a U.S. remedy has the result of
encouraging anticompetitive conspiracies to allocate the market.
Indeed, such conspiracies directly conflict with the policy behind
treaties that lower 5governmental barriers to international trade in
goods and services.
Interestingly, to the extent that cases like Statoil can proceed
in a U.S. court, they may actually level the antitrust playing field for
U.S. firms in competition with foreign ones. Putting aside the
possibility of joint and several liability, in the absence of a remedy
for the foreign-injured plaintiff in Statoil, the American conspirator in
the market allocation would face treble damages suits from its U.S.
victims, but its foreign competitor would face victims who could only
utilize weaker private remedies. The broad view puts the foreign
52 Statoil, 241 F.3d at 422-23.
53 Id.
54 id.
55 Id.
56 See John 0. McGinnis, The Political Economy of International Antitrust
Harmonization, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 549, 553 (2003) (identifying the WTO's
purpose in "eliminat[ing] tariff and other barriers to trade in goods and services"
between nations).
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competitor in the same leaky boat as its U.S. counterpart. Such a
result is ironically in keeping with the clearest intent of the FTAIA's
1982 enactment-ugly economic nationalism.
IV. Conclusion
Any argument that more or less jurisdiction will lead to better
results in antitrust policy suffers from a basic weakness. It is hard to
come by good data on, for example, what cartels exist in the world,
and which ones are not caught. As a result, the FTAIA debate has
focused on such issues as whether there will be more or less litigation
in U.S. courts depending on which view carries the day.57
It is worth noting that less litigation, by itself in isolation,
should be a good thing. But, such a result would be unwelcome if it
came at the cost of a dazzling increase in unpunished, undeterred,
consumer-soaking anticompetitive behavior. Even if the harm to
consumer welfare were lighter, this would be an argument against the
narrow view.
Litigated cases form only a part of the universe of behavior
that the antitrust laws should affect. Besides deterrence, the
possibility of dispute settlement is quite important. Litigated cases
may tell us about how courts handle disputes, but they do not tell us
about how legal rules affect the behavior of those who are subject to
58them. How the broad view and the narrow view of subject matter
jurisdiction conform the behavior of potential litigants is crucial to
understanding whether the administrative burden of having such
cases in U.S. courts makes sense.
57 See, e.g., Statoil, 241 F.3d at 427-28 (conjuring up specter of "any entities,
anywhere.. .flock[ing] to United States Federal court").
58 See George Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for
Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984) (stating that the information within reported
cases "discloses very little about how legal rules affect the behavior of those
subject to them").
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